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Bare Sticks and Naked Pity :
Rhetoric and Representation
in Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)
Capital Case Records
Thomas Buoye1
Cet article examine la rhétorique et les représentations inhérentes aux 
dossiers des procès capitaux  chinois du XVIIIe siècle, période où la peine de 
mort fut étendue aux « bâtons nus », terme argotique désignant les hommes 
marginaux portés à la délinquance. Les empereurs Qing, en adoptant 
une politique pénale  combinant le « profilage criminel » et le caractère 
supposément dissuasif de la peine capitale présentaient un sérieux défi à 
la bureaucratie judiciaire. Au plan idéologique,  l’imposition de sentences 
cruelles et le ciblage des « bâtons nus » suscitaient un dilemme pour les 
magistrats locaux qui opéraient dans les limites  d’une procédure de jugement 
et  d’un système judiciaire étroitement bureaucratisés. Cet article argumente 
que ces magistrats utilisaient les dossiers judiciaires pour présenter sous un 
jour sympathique la pauvreté et le désespoir ruraux, en allant à  l’encontre des 
dénonciations impériales de la criminalité violente. Selon un ethos judiciaire 
traditionnellement porté à  l’indulgence et à la sauvegarde de la vie – 
leitmotivs de la justice pénale  chinoise depuis des siècles – ces représentations 
jouaient sur les émotions pour clairement faire savoir au pouvoir central que 
plutôt que les déficiences morales des « bâtons nus »,  c’étaient les  conditions 
économiques qui jouaient un rôle important dans la fragilisation de la famille 
et de  l’ordre social.
This article examines the rhetoric and representation of Chinese capital 
case records from the eighteenth century, when, as part of a far-reaching 
crackdown on violent crime, the use of capital punishment was extended 
to crimes  committed by ‘bare sticks’, a  common term for the underclass of 
crime-prone males. Adopting a strategy to suppress crime that  combined 
‘criminal profiling’ with the presumed deterrent power of capital punishment, 
Qing emperors presented serious challenges to the judicial bureaucracy. 
1 Thomas Buoye is Associate Professor of History and Department Chair at the University of Tulsa 
and Research Associate at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan. He earned 
his PhD from the University of Michigan, in 1991. He is currently working on two projects : Capital 
Crime and Criminal Justice in Eighteenth-century China and Ruler, State and Economy in Eigh-
teenth-Century China : The Economic Role of the Qing Imperial Household Department. His main 
publications include : Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy : Violent Disputes over Property 
Rights in Eighteenth-Century China, Cambridge, CUP, 2000 ; Criminal Justice in China : The Place 
of Incarceration’, China Review International, 2012, 18, 1, pp. 14-18. Sanctimony and Self-decep-
tion : The Eighteenth-Century Origins of Western Misperceptions of Chinese Capital Punishment, 
Studies in Chinese History, 2013, 23, pp. 1-26 ; Evenhandedness and Excess : The Diverse Fates of 
Ethnic Minorities and Women in Qing Criminal Justice, Xingbie, zongjiao, zhongzu, jieji yu Zhong-
guo chuantong sifa [Gender, Religion, Ethnicity, Class and Chinese Traditional Law] (Lau Nap-yin 
ed.), Taibei, Academia Sincia, Philology Research Institute, 2013, pp. 257-292.
28 THOMAS BUOYE
Ideologically, imposing harsh sentences and profiling bare sticks posed 
dilemmas, for county magistrates who operated within the  confines of the 
rigidly bureaucratized structure of judicial and sentencing review. The article 
argues that county magistrates utilized case records to present sympathetic 
representations of rural poverty and despair that was at odds with the 
imperial denunciations of violent crime. Rooted in the longstanding judicial 
ethos to seek leniency and save life, hallmarks of Chinese criminal justice 
for centuries, these emotional depictions sent a clear message to the central 
authorities that economic  conditions, rather than the moral failings of bare 
sticks, played an important role in undermining familial stability and social 
order.
At the peak of its power in the eighteenth century the Qing Empire had equaled or surpassed all previous Chinese dynasties in terms of population 
growth, economic prosperity, and territorial expanse. In stark  contrast to the 
humiliating losses to foreign powers and the devastating rebellions of the nineteenth 
century, scholars have long  considered the eighteenth century a ‘flourishing age’.2 
Peace and prosperity were the hallmarks of the era, but on closer examination, this 
pivotal period witnessed both the full grandeur and the ineludible limits of pre-
modern Chinese political, social, and economic institutions. Varying across time 
and space, the inexorable influence of economic  commercialization and population 
expansion rippled through the vast empire and transformed society. The results 
of these powerful forces for change were often mixed. Along with the benefits 
of unprecedented economic and demographic growth came ethnic strife, sexual 
assaults, violent land disputes, a sorcery scare, and sectarian rebellion that scarred 
the eighteenth-century social landscape.3 Seeking to stem a troubling decline in 
social order in its Chinese domains,4 the Qing court launched a far-reaching, but ill- 
conceived crackdown on violent crime. At the forefront of the drive was legislation 
that mandated harsher penalties, including capital punishment, for crimes when 
the offenses were  committed by ‘bare sticks’ (guanggun 光棍), a  common term 
for the rootless underclass of unmarried males who were  considered crime-prone 
troublemakers. While Chinese law had a long history of differential punishments 
based on kinship and gender, bare-stick substatutes effectively defined a new class of 
criminals who were subject to more extreme penalties based on their social identity.
Embracing a strategy to suppress crime that  combined ‘criminal profiling’ with 
the presumed deterrent power of capital punishment, Qing emperors presented 
serious practical and ideological challenges to the judicial bureaucracy. Practically, 
the elaborate and time- consuming procedures for the investigation, trial, review, and 
sentencing of capital crimes that had been the mainstay of Chinese criminal justice 
since the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) remained in place. Increasing the number of 
capital crimes without allotting additional resources or personnel threatened to 
2 The traditional term in Chinese, shengshi, (盛世), usually translated as ‘flourishing age’, has nor-
mally been reserved for exceptional periods of political,  cultural and economic development.
3 The literature on these topics has been prodigious. For ethnic  conflicts see Dai (2009). For sexual 
assaults and rape see Sommer (2000) and Theiss (2004). For violent disputes over property rights see 
Buoye (2000). For the sorcery scare, see Kuhn (1990). For sectarian rebellions, see Wang (2011).
4 The Qing rulers were Manchurians and their multi-ethnic empire include vast territories that were 
predominantly Tibetan, Mongolian, and Turkic. These domains were ruled differently than the more 
populous Han Chinese provinces.
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swamp the criminal justice system, which was already showing signs of strain. 
Ideologically, imposing harsh sentences and profiling bare sticks also posed political, 
moral, and cognitive dilemmas, particularly for county magistrates (zhixian 知縣) 
who dealt firsthand with violent crime and accused criminals. As a review of several 
exemplary capital case records reveals, reports of capital crimes by county magistrates 
sometimes presented evocative narratives that were at odds with the assumptions 
underlying the bare-stick legislation. These somewhat sympathetic representations 
of rural poverty and despair were, no doubt, rooted in the longstanding judicial ethos 
to seek leniency and save life that had been the hallmarks of Chinese criminal justice 
for centuries. 5 In the midst of a growing  concern over the rise in violent crime, 
these emotional depictions sent a clear message that economic  conditions played an 
important role in undermining familial stability and social order.
REPORTS OF CAPITAL CRIMES
The review of capital cases varied over time, but the long-term trend was toward 
greater bureaucratization and centralized  control in the prosecution and sentencing 
of capital crimes. In the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) capital cases were initially 
investigated and tried at the county level, and subsequently underwent automatic 
retrial and review at the prefectural, provincial and central government levels, 
 culminating in the  emperor’s verdict. The judicial review established  culpability, 
cited applicable statutes and assigned specific punishments in strict adherence to the 
code. Judicial review required straightforward accounts of the essential elements of 
the crime, forensic evidence, and testimony from the accused and key witnesses to 
determine which laws had been violated and what punishments were appropriate. At 
each succeeding level of review the presiding official provided a separate report and 
recommendation. Complete case records were voluminous and quite redundant. The 
district  magistrate’s initial report was the most extensive and  comprehensive. While 
each of the officials was responsible for the document he submitted, the reports 
were most likely prepared by a legal expert of his staff. Most Qing officials were 
generalists who had no formal legal training. It was  common for county magistrates 
to rely on secretaries to  compose legal case records. So saying, the magistrate 
alone was responsible for the accuracy of the report and judicial affairs were 
carefully scrutinized and evaluated. Concern for his professional future dictated 
that the county magistrate diligently oversee every aspect of the investigation and 
reporting of capital crime. Since the case record was subject to automatic review 
at every level of administration, it was the one document that was guaranteed to 
receive the scrutiny of a  magistrate’s highest superiors. While it is unlikely that the 
emperor personally read every report, Qing emperors were known to  comment on 
 controversial or unusual case.
5 The rhetoric of leniency permeated the Qing judicial system from top to bottom. As the Kangxi em-
peror (1661-1722) noted in his preface to the revised Qing code in 1678 : “I have the utmost feeling 
for human life, especially for that of my people ; and where at all possible, I am unwilling to impose 
the death penalty.” Quoted in Alabaster (1936, p. 427). Huang Liuhong, author of a widely circulated 
seventeenth-century administrative handbook for county magistrates stated : “The magistrate must 
always lean on the side of leniency. If there is one iota of reason for the suspect to be exonerated, the 
magistrate must explore the point to mitigate the punishment.” See Huang (1984, p. 65).
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Reports of capital crimes cannot be fully understood without  consideration of 
the two-tiered structure of judicial and sentencing review as well as the general 
predilection of magistrates to seek leniency that were hallmarks of Qing criminal 
justice. The legal requirements of the first round of judicial review required 
straightforward accounts of the essential elements of the crime, forensic evidence, 
and testimony from the accused and key witnesses that were necessary to determine 
which laws had been violated and what punishments were appropriate. Influenced 
by ideological values of benevolence and paternalism, magistrates interspersed 
case records with understated observations on the individuals involved in the crime 
that suggested their psychological states, motivations, and moral character. These 
observations could be used to mitigate final sentencing at the autumn assizes. 
Accused killers were often depicted as otherwise decent people under duress in 
extraordinary circumstances who inadvertently caused a death. In my opinion, these 
depictions were meant to obtain leniency for the vast majority of capital criminals 
who were sentenced to imprisonment pending final sentencing at the annual autumn 
assizes (jianhou qiuhou chujue 監候秋後處決)..
For nearly two decade historians have been mining judicial archives, especially 
the routine memorials of the Board of Punishments (xingke tiben, 刑科題本) at 
the Number One Historical Archives in Beijing, to expand our understanding of 
Qing social, economic, and legal history. My own research on violent disputes over 
property rights relied on capital case records to reconstruct the everyday struggles 
of rural society. Sampled at roughly five intervals from a collection of nearly 56,000 
case records for homicides related to disputes over land or debts for the Qianlong 
reign, I looked at over 13,000 reports for all of China. From that sample I read 
2,152 cases from Guangdong, Shandong, and Sichuan, which included disputes 
over debts and land. From that sample I focused exclusively on homicides related 
to disputes over specific property rights issues6 in three provinces : Guangdong (480 
cases), Shandong (25 cases), and Sichuan (125 cases). While the number of extant 
documents as well as the number of cases used in my study is not insignificant, 
in order to get a broader perspective on violent crime during the Qianlong reign 
(1736-1795) one would need to examine two additional collections of capital cases 
“blows and affrays” (dou’ou 斗毆) and “marriage and illicit sex” (hunyin jianqing
婚姻姦情) that together  contain about twice as many cases. Suffice to say, that the 
extant documentation of violent crimes for the six decades of the Qianlong reign is 
voluminous.
My current research  concerns extreme crimes involving multiple homicides, 
brutal killings, intra-family killings, inter-ethnic violence, adulterous wives killing 
their husbands, and other capital crimes that violated cherished social norms, to 
ascertain the limits of leniency in judicial practice and the eighteenth-century crisis of 
Chinese criminal justice. Despite the  common Western stereotype of Chinese justice 
as capricious, corrupt, and cruel, capital case records reveal that county magistrates 
carefully examined the facts and applied the law in capital investigations.7 After 
reading thousands of case records written by county magistrates from hundreds of 
different jurisdictions from across the length and breadth of China, one cannot help 
6 I distinguished two categories of disputes :  contractual, which included rent defaults, evictions, and 
redemptions of  conditional sales, and non- contractual, which included boundary and water rights.
7 For an example of statutory pardons, see Buoye (2007).
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but be struck with the  consistency, clarity, and  competence with which magistrates 
investigated, adjudicated, and reported capital crimes.
County magistrates had a range of responsibilities from education to tax collection, 
but the investigation, trial, and reporting of capital crime were arguably the most 
 complicated, onerous, and carefully monitored of all their duties. The successful 
investigation and trial of a capital crime required the supervision of a variety of 
subordinates, including  constables to arrest suspects and gather evidence, coroners 
to examine wounds and perform autopsies, and legal secretaries to research the law 
and  compile reports. Procedurally, the county  magistrate’s direct responsibilities 
were limited to examining the evidence, determining  culpability, identifying the 
appropriate law, and recommending a specific sentence. When done properly, capital 
case records were masterpieces of bureaucratic efficiency and thankfully, cornucopias 
of legal, social, and economic history for modern researchers. Interestingly, within 
the  confines of the reports of capital crime there existed a subtle and reliable channel 
of  communication between a county magistrate and his superiors, including the 
emperor. Every county magistrate knew for certain that his superiors would glance 
at if not carefully peruse these reports. Given the  complexity of the sentencing 
procedures, official scrutiny of trial records could  continue for years after a crime 
had occurred.8 I argue here that given the certainty that their reports would receive 
repeated review, some county magistrates availed themselves of this “channel of 
 communication” to address, however subtly or indirectly, the prevailing views of 
the sources of violent crime and social disorder and the dire circumstances of the 
rural poor.
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHINESE SOCIETY
While emphasis may vary, historians generally agree that the transformative 
impact of demographic pressures, environmental degradation, political corruption, 
and social instability were readily apparent in the latter half of the eighteenth century. 
Noting the similarities to the classical symptoms of ‘dynastic decline’, Philip Kuhn 
and Susan Mann have examined the interconnections between the “overproduction 
of literate men”9 and “rampant” corruption, and rising demographic pressures and 
8 The ultimate fate of individuals who were imprisoned awaiting final sentencing at the autumn as-
sizes in the eighteenth century was uncertain. By law if capital punishment was deferred for three 
 consecutive years after the initial review at the autumn assizes, the death sentence could be reduced 
to banishment. In practice archival records clearly indicate that the three year deadline was often 
exceeded. Further research on this issue is needed but mandatory investigations of deaths of prison-
ers awaiting final sentences for capital crimes reveal that some individuals remained in local jails for 
over three years. The most egregious case I have encountered was an individual who died of illness 
in a county gaol after his capital sentence had been deferred at 24  consecutive annual meetings of the 
autumn assizes.
9 Beginning in the Song dynasty (960-1279) civil service examination was the normal route to govern-
ment service. The  content of the exams was based on Confucian classics that educated male elites 
began studying in  childhood. In this sense the overwhelming majority of Chinese officials could be 
 consider literate men or scholars. Exams were held at the local, provincial, and national levels but 
only the national level degree holders were guaranteed government employment. While the Chi-
nese elite  comprised only 2% of the population, limits on the number of degrees granted and the 
unwillingness of Qing rulers to expand the size of government meant that the absolute number of 
highly educated elites who could not find government employment was also on the rise during the 
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an increasingly  commercialized economy.10 Similarly, William Rowe has cited 
the “sudden and wrenching population growth”, “unprecedented geographical and 
social mobility” and “rapid  commercialization and monetization of the economy” as 
the important trends of that transformed eighteenth-century China.11 While agreeing 
that the “single most important structural change was explosive population growth”, 
Wang Wensheng has also blamed the large scale social unrest in the Qianlong reign 
(1736-1795) on the growing gap between “state ambitions and state capacities” and 
the failure to increase the “political resources allotted for local administration”.12 
More people and more territory were historical measures of dynastic prosperity, but 
Qing emperors and government officials alike knew that they also faced serious 
administrative challenges. As one of the most famous scholar officials of this era, 
Hong Liangji wrote candidly and presciently about the problems of overpopulation, 
political corruption, and the need to reform local administration. Famous for citing 
the potential catastrophic impact of unrestrained population growth, Hong also 
 complained about poor channels of  communication between officials as well as the 
throne and the overall decline of local administration.13  Hong’s frank criticism of the 
dynasty earned him a suspended death sentence and banishment to Ili in Xinjiang. 
Not surprisingly, no other officials ever matched  Hong’s outspokenness, and there 
were few substantive institutional reforms in China until the middle of the nineteenth 
century.
The sorcery scare of 1768, which Philip Kuhn has written about so insightfully, 
provides a powerful illustration of the bureaucratic politics that impinged on Qing 
criminal justice.14 In many ways the prosecution of the soulstealing15 was emblematic 
of the social and economic milieu of the eighteenth century. “Dropping out of the 
settled occupations into vagrancy and begging”, which Kuhn calls “downward 
migration”, was the backdrop for the sorcery scares. The potential for social panic was 
serious and the incidents, which often involved the cutting of victims’ queues, had 
political overtones that drew the attention of the Qianlong emperor. When provincial 
judicial officials, who initially did not share  Qianlong’s same sense of trepidation, 
failed to placate his  concerns, the emperor personally intervened and transformed the 
eighteenth century. See Elman (2000) for a description of the increasingly  competitive nature of the 
civil service examinations in the Qing. 
10 See Mann, Kuhn (1976, pp. 107-163).
11 Rowe (2002, pp. 473-562 p. 473).  Rowe’s essay draws on a wide range of scholarship including the 
classic English-language studies : Ping-ti (1959) and Lin (1990). For an in-depth economic analysis 
of the period, see Myers, Wang, (2002), pp. 570-572.
12 See Wang (2011). While Wang agrees with much of the received wisdom on the topic, he stresses 
the  Qianlong’s “overambitious attempts to push empire-building beyond a supportable limit” as an 
important factor in undermining the  government’s ability to maintain social order.
13 See Liu (1999, pp. 172-178). Some Western scholars have dubbed Hong “ China’s Malthus” though 
Hong wrote some five years earlier.
14 Kuhn (1990). Briefly, the sorcery scare was based on the popular belief that the human soul could be 
separated from the body and that the individual who obtained the soul could use its force. Alleged 
incidents of soulstealing, particularly when the victims were male  children, led to violent attacks on 
the accused perpetrators.
15 Kuhn (1990, pp. 26-27). The process involved reciting incantations over some physical entity that 
had been removed from the victim. Quite often this was hair from the  individual’s queue, the politi-
cally significant ponytail worn by Chinese men. The ruling Manchu dynasty had decreed the wearing 
of the queue by all Han Chinese males under penalty of death.
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scope and intensity of the official campaign to uncover soulstealing. In this superb 
work of social history, Kuhn masterfully explores the deep  complexities of these 
events. Most relevant to this study is the reaction of provincial judicial officials to 
imperial intervention. Based on their initial reactions, most provincial officials likely 
saw soulstealing as a troublesome folk superstition. But once the emperor intervened 
directly and forcefully, the previously skeptical suddenly began turning up  culprits. 
Unlike the more pervasive and enduring threat of the generic bare sticks, the sorcery 
scare of 1768 was a protracted affair that drew the intense and direct scrutiny of the 
emperor. the sorcery scare illustrated an important point : from the lofty perch of 
Beijing a variety of mundane and extraordinary political and psychological  concerns 
could easily distort the imperial perception of eighteenth-century grass roots society.
Nowhere were the  contradictory crosscurrents of the eighteenth century more 
apparent than in the adjudication of capital crimes. The cautious and appropriate 
application of punishments, particularly in capital cases, had been a  consistent theme 
in Chinese legal  commentaries for over two millennia.16 In practice, a deep regard 
for human life was manifested in the special procedures for handling death penalty 
cases in Chinese law. Procedures for reviewing capital cases varied over time, but 
the long-term trend was toward greater bureaucratization and centralized  control 
in the adjudication and sentencing of capital crimes and this trend reached its apex 
in the Qing dynasty. The reluctance to expand the government despite a doubling 
of population meant that the multi-tiered and repetitive reviews of capital crimes 
and most death sentences greatly exacerbated what was an enormous administrative 
burden for the Qing bureaucracy.
CHINESE LEGAL HERITAGE
For a variety of  complex reasons –  cultural, intellectual, political and economic 
– Western observers frequently have misunderstood or misrepresented Chinese 
legal heritage and judicial practice, but the great Chinese dynasties could not have 
obtained the vast territorial expanses, elaborate administrative structures, and vibrant 
 commercial economies without the existence of well-established legal institutions. 
The Qing dynasty was no different than its illustrious predecessors. Despite their 
alien origins, the Manchu  conquerors readily embraced the Chinese legal heritage. 
Even more impressively, in 1670 the Kangxi Emperor (1661-1722) espoused 
Confucian principles and endorsed the efficacy of law in his Sacred Edict. Consisting 
of 16 terse maxims, the Sacred Edict has been called “a summation of Confucian 
moral values”17 and the “most  concise and authoritative statement of Confucian 
ideology”.18 Meant to be read aloud in every village and town in the empire, the 
Sacred Edict envisioned a well-ordered society of filial subjects who obeyed the 
16 Noting the irreversibility of capital punishment, the oldest extant Chinese document that discussed 
the administration of justice, the Kang Gao (康誥) (dating from the early 1046-771 BCE), strongly 
admonished rulers to apply physical punishment judiciously and urged the substitution of fines for 
corporeal punishments in doubtful cases. The Lü xing, (呂刑) (dating from the Warring States period 
c. 475-221 BCE) also urged caution and mercy in the use of physical punishments. See MacCormack 
(1986-1987, pp. 35-47).
17 Spence (1999, p. 60).
18 Mair (1985, p. 325). 
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law, avoided disputes, extirpated heresy, paid taxes, and peacefully engaged in 
agriculture. Interestingly, law was an integral  component of this Confucian-cloaked 
pronunciamento. The eighth maxim, “Explain the laws to warn the ignorant and 
obstinate”, endorsed law as a tool of government and succinctly encapsulated elite 
attitudes toward the source of criminal behavior – ignorance and obstinacy.19
The implications of the eighth maxim for a Confucian-trained official with 
experience in criminal justice would have been abundantly clear. Ignorance versus 
obstinacy established a simple dichotomy. Optimistically, the maxim implied that 
propagating the law eliminated ignorance and reduced crime. Furthermore, if criminal 
behavior was remedial through education, leniency was justified. Demonstrating 
the premise that dissemination of the legal knowledge went hand-in-hand with the 
propagation of Confucian ideals, one of the earliest  commentaries on the Sacred 
Edict, published in 1679, explained all sixteen maxims with reference to specific 
laws and “examples of applicable legal guidelines”.20 Targeting popular ignorance of 
the law with public lectures clearly indicated both a belief in the efficacy of law and 
the responsibility of social elites to transmit legal knowledge to the illiterate masses. 
As Janet Theiss notes in her study of the eighteenth-century chastity  cult, adopting 
the approach of “teaching and  cultivation” (jiaoyang 教養) of the people, or the 
“transformation of customs through education” (jiaohu 教化), was an important 
 component of imperial ambitions to transform society.21
However, what if crime did not abate despite the best efforts to educate ? Following 
the ignorance versus obstinacy dichotomy, Qing officials could assume it must 
have been due to obstinacy and obstinate criminals clearly deserved punishment. 
While the tendency to seek leniency and “save life” were cornerstones of Chinese 
legal philosophy that mitigated severity, there is plenty of evidence that Chinese 
magistrates did not shy away from using harsh punishments when criminal acts were 
deemed exceedingly heinous or wanton. What was distinctive about the eighteenth 
century was the legislative turn that resorted to the secernment of bare sticks.
THE LEGISLATIVE TURN
The Qing law code was a living document that underwent revisions to address the 
changing needs of Chinese society. Officially, the emperor was the  chief law maker 
and some laws originated in imperial decrees, but normally the emperor “approved or 
rejected recommendations made to him in memorials submitted by officials charged 
with judicial and legislative authority”.22 Zheng Qin, an authority on the Qing code, 
has noted “the extraordinary enthusiasm and dedication of top imperial authorities 
19 Perpetrators of homicides, regardless of the circumstances, were invariably described as “ignorant 
of the law” and frequently labeled “obstinate”. The retention of these formulaic references, even 
when capital crime reports underwent extensive streamlining during the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, indicates the importance of this understanding of origins of criminal behavior.
20 Mair (1985, p. 329).
21 Theiss (2004, p. 35). Janet Theiss notes that “The  concept of jiaohua was an old staple of Confucian 
statecraft discourse, but it acquired a distinctly paternalistic and bureaucratic cast in the eighteenth 
century as emperors and officials basking in the peace, prosperity, and imperial might of the High 
Qing formulated new ambitions for the  state’s role in society”.
22 Edwards (2003, p. 181).
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toward their lawmaking enterprise”, which he argues indicated “the importance of 
the law to Qing rulers.”23 In fact, a major revision of the code, the third since the 
Qing dynasty was founded in 1644, was  completed in 1740. The new code  contained 
the original 436 statutes, most of which were unchanged, and 1,049 revised or newly 
added substatutes.24 Knowledge of these revisions was crucial because magistrates 
were required “to cite the statues and substatutes upon which they relied in deciding 
a case to ensure that the result  conformed to the statutory purpose”.25 Any historian 
familiar with Qing capital case records can readily attest to the importance of citing 
specific statutes for every crime reported.26 Tellingly, the new substatutes were 
guideposts to the sources of tension in eighteenth-century society. For example, 
addressing property rights in land, the revised code included a range of substatutes 
that included the criminalization of rent defaults and the clarification of terms of 
 conditional sales.27 Given  China’s rich legal heritage, it  comes as no surprise that 
eighteenth-century emperors resorted to legislation to define property rights and to 
 combat the rise in violent crime. What was surprising was the number and specificity 
of new substatutes. For example, during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) there was 
one statute and two substatutes in the section on robbery (qiangdao 強盜), during 
the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) there was still only one statute but there were an 
additional 49 substatutes, “most of which dated from the 17th and 18th centuries”.28 
Similarly, fostering and protecting female chastity was also codified during the 
eighteenth century. Legislation on sexual assault provides another very sobering 
example. Fortunately, we have two in-depth studies of sexual assault for eighteenth-
century China, by Matthew Sommer and Janet Theiss.29 Both scholars agree that 
that anxiety at the highest levels of government was behind the proliferation of new 
legislation that increased penalties for sexual assault and related crimes. Duly noting 
the substatutes related to illicit sex promulgated during the Yongzheng and Qianlong 
reigns – “illegalities in the  contracting of marriages (some twenty-five substatutes), 
homicides arising out of sexual assaults, adultery and prostitution (altogether over 
forty substatutes), and causing a woman to  commit suicide through improper 
behavior (some twenty-five substatutes)” – Theiss argues that “collectively these 
myriad new substatutes reflected widespread anxiety among mid-Qing elites”.30 
Similarly, in his discussion of rape laws Sommer notes “a plethora of new measures 
aimed to suppress the ‘rootless rascals’31 (guang gun) who were now imagined as 
23 Zhen (1995, p. 332).
24 Ibid. The final published revision of the code in 1870  contained a total of 1892 substatutes. To date 
there is no  complete translation of the substatutes in English although the unchanging statutes have 
been translated in to French and English. Scholars only familiar with the statutes, many of which 
remained unchanged in successive dynasties spanning several centuries, have mistakenly gotten the 
impression that Chinese law was “unchanging”.
25 Edwards (2003, p. 183).
26 Indeed, Jerome Bourgon has called this principle of legality “one of the major institutional inventions 
of Chinese civilization.” See Bourgon (2012, p. 171).
27 Buoye (2000, p. 96).
28 Meijer (1991, p. 24).
29 Sommer (2000) ; Theiss (2004).
30 Theiss (2004, p. 47).
31 Sommer prefers to translate guanggun as “rootless rascal”.
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sexual predators”. 32 Whether it was myriad or plethora, this legislation disturbingly 
reflected the tenor of the times. For example, a substatute was added in 1788 (QL53) 
and later revised in 1809 (JQ14) under statute against Plotting to Kill Another (282) 
that increased the penalty to “immediate” decapitation33 for the leader of the plot to 
kill when the victim was a  child aged ten or younger. If there was extortion or sexual 
abuse, the penalty was increased to decapitation with exposure of the head in public.34 
The fact that a law specifically addressing the premeditated killing of  children under 
ten years of age was deemed necessary was a frightening indication of the types 
of violent acts that were perpetrated in Qing China. By the eighteenth century the 
defining characteristics of a bare stick, violent coercion or physical intimidation, had 
become firmly imbedded in Qing legal parlance and political discourse. Interestingly, 
both the Qianlong and Yongzheng emperors framed the problem of violent crime in 
terms of the moral failings of bare sticks and responded by promoting  conservative 
moral values and promulgating harsher laws that specifically targeted bare sticks. 
The  combination of moral exhortation,  condemnatory rhetoric, and harsh sentencing 
was readily apparent in the proliferation of new substatutes promulgated during the 
eighteenth century.
BARE STICKS
In the eighteenth-century judicial discourse the term bare stick became 
synonymous with a variety of serious crimes, but the use of the term to describe 
rootless males had been part of the Chinese vernacular since the Song dynasty.35 
By the Ming dynasty the terms “bare sticks” and “urban toughs” (lahu 啦唬) were 
used to describe members of criminal gangs involved in robbery, intimidation, and 
prostitution in the Beijing area.36 The term also appears in the popular Ming novel The 
Plum in the Golden Vase, which describes an incident in which bare sticks induce the 
son of an Imperial Commissioner to join them in visiting a brothel. When the bare 
sticks later attempt to extort money from the hapless youth he seeks the help of the 
local magistrate who orders a beating for the “detestable” bare sticks.37 According 
to Qing literary sources, anyone engaged in racketeering, swindling, black mail, 
or other “scoundrelly activities were generally known as bare sticks.”38 Legally, 
the term first appeared in the Ming code.39 The Ming code specifically labeled bare 
sticks : demobilized soldiers, the homeless, and other marginalized people “not 
32 Sommer (2000, p. 10).
33 The sentence of “immediate” decapitation could not be carried out until after a full judicial review.
34 All citations for substatutes  come from the Xue Yongsheng, Duli Cunyi on line at [http ://www.terada.
law.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dlcy/index.htm] (accessed May 23, 2013).
35 Chen (1993, p. 272).
36 Robinson (2001, p. 49). Robinson includes both bare sticks and urban toughs under the heading of 
“men of violence”, criminal gangs who were active in Beijing and its satellite cities in the mid-Ming.
37 Sheng (1993, pp. 269-271).
38 Chen (1993, p. 273).
39 For example, the term appears frequently in the Huangming tiaofa shilei zuan 〈〈皇明條法事類纂〉〉 
vol. 34 Xingbu lei (刑部類). I am indebted to my colleagues, Jiang Yonglin and Wu Yanhong, who 
explained the significance of the Ming statutes.
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engaged in honest work” (buwu zhengye不務正業) who used force and intimidation 
to swindle honest people. Whatever the sociological origins of bare sticks, the term 
had become  common judicial jargon in the Ming code in 1443,40 but there was no 
specific offense defined as the bare stick substatute until the Qing dynasty.
Judicial officials throughout the realm must have known how seriously the 
emperors viewed the problem of bare sticks. During the Qing dynasty the scope 
of bare stick crimes was expanded to include illegal activities of yamen personnel, 
pettifogging, false accusation, fraud, opening graves, hoarding, tax resistance, 
witchcraft, and other crimes.41 In 1705 the Kangxi emperor (1661-1722) excluded 
bare sticks from imperial pardons and in 1729 the Yongzheng emperor (1723-1735) 
 commended officials who cracked down on bare sticks.
BARE STICKS IN THE LAW
While there was nothing equivalent to a modern legal definition that strictly 
delineated who was a bare stick, substatute 273.7,42 under the statute “Using 
Intimidation to Obtain Property,” was  commonly referred to as the “bare stick 
substatute” (guanggun li光棍例). Interestingly, this substatute lists a range of crimes 
involving violent extortion, intimidation, beating, killing and false accusations that 
should be punished more severely “if the circumstances are serious” and bare sticks 
were “truly to blame”.43 The only other term used to refer to the perpetrators is 
another general term usually translated as scoundrel (e’gun惡棍). Apparently, it 
was assumed that judicial officials would know bare sticks when they saw them. 
As the table below indicates, the bare stick substatute was cited in another sixteen 
substatutes. In fifteen of those substatutes the bare sticks substatute was to increase 
the severity of punishments. Some of these substatutes were already in versions of 
the code  compiled during the Shunzhi (1644-1661) or Kangxi (1662-1722), but most 
were added or amended during the Yongzheng (1723-1735) and Qianlong (1736-
1795) reigns.
Laws That Cite the Bare Stick Substatute44 :
Law  Substatutes
– Monopolizing Markets (154) 1
– Pushing Honorable Persons too Far and Causing Them to Revolt (210) 1
– Wrongful Taking in the Daytime (268) 3
– Using Intimidation to Obtain Property (273) 3
– Kidnapping Persons and Selling the Person Kidnapped (275) 1
40 Zhang (2008).
41 Zhang (2008, pp. 156-158).
42 Numbering of laws and substatutes follows Xue (1970).
43 A translation of the entire substatute can be found in Sommer (2000, pp. 327-328).
44 The substatutes in this table include the bare stick substatute 273.7, and all other substatutes that cite 
the bare stick substatute to assess punishments. The term bare stick appears elsewhere in the Qing 
code but the substatute is not cited.
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– Engaging in an Affray and Killing or Intentionally Killing Another (290) 1
– Striking an Imperial Emissary or the Head Official in  One’s Own Office (306) 1
– Fornication (366) 4
– Persons Sentenced to Penal Servitude or Exile who Run Away (390) 1
– Citing Laws and Orders in Deciding Cases (415) 1
While the link between bare sticks and sexual crime is warranted, given that 
four substatutes under the law against “Fornication” were sentenced under the bare 
stick substitute, perpetrators of crimes sentenced under the substatute were not 
merely rootless male sexual predators. For example, substatute 154.6, under the law 
against “Monopolizing Markets”, which  concerns crimes  committed by employees 
of the Imperial Household Department or their relatives, imperial princes, eunuchs, 
officials or their relatives – none of whom would be  considered downwardly mobile 
males – cited the bare sticks substatute to determine the punishments.45 Other crimes, 
such as Pushing Honorable Persons too Far and Causing Them to Revolt (210.2), 
addressed a variety of illegal forms of collective actions, such as tax resistance or 
monopolizing markets as well as instigating lawsuits or interfering with local civil 
service examinations. The bare stick substatute was cited to authorize immediate 
decapitation for the leaders of these actions when the act involved more than forty or 
fifty people.46 Similarly, Wrongful Taking in the Daytime (268.23) specifically named 
bandit groups active in four provinces and cited the bare sticks substatute to punish 
the leaders of bands of five or more. Fornication has the most substatutes citing the 
bare stick substatute but here too the picture was  complicated. Appallingly, two of 
the four substatutes under Fornication involved assaults on minors. The substatutes 
under Fornication that applied the bare stick substatute included gang rapes (366.2), 
kidnapping and sodomizing boys (366.3), raping and causing the death of young 
girls under twelve or enticing girls over the age of ten into sex (366.4) and (366.9) 
rapes  committed by lamas and monks. Suffice to say that although sexual crimes 
bulked large in official denunciations of bare sticks, “bare stick crimes” included a 
wide variety of violent crimes that might be undertaken individually or collectively. 
Depending on the crime, bare stick would be better translated as hoodlum, rapist, 
swindler, extortionist, or gangster.
Space does not permit detailed discussion of every crime, but the  common 
denominator of “bare stick crimes” does not appear to be the social status of the 
perpetrators. On the  contrary, these crimes appear to be related, albeit in very different 
ways, to the social side-effects of an increasingly  complex  commercialized economy 
and a highly mobile population. As grass roots officials responsible for day-to-day 
administration, county magistrates were well aware that the economic expansion, 
population growth, and increasing  commercialization of the eighteenth century had 
serious social repercussions. Similarly, regional variation in economic development 
was significant. Time and place were critically important to understanding 
 connections between social  conflict and economic change.
45 According to Xue Yunsheng, the law originated in the Ming dynasty, but the death penalty was not 
invoked then. Available at [http ://www.terada.law.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dlcy/index.htm] (accessed May 23, 
2013).
46 Ibid.
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REGIONAL VARIATION IN CRIME
As homicides related to violent disputes over property rights have revealed 
significant regional variation in the overall levels of violence as well as the social 
and economic status of disputants.47 Given that homicides related to property rights 
were a transitional phenomenon related to induced demand for changes in property 
rights, it makes sense that provinces experiencing economic change at different 
times would also exhibit different patterns of violence. For the six sample years 
used to  compare regional variation in homicide related to property right disputes, 
Shandong had far fewer homicides (25 cases), than Guangdong (150) and Sichuan 
(125). Interestingly, although Shandong had fewer cases overall, the individuals 
involved in violent disputes there more closely fit the rootless male profile.48
Information gleaned from capital case records reveals that the  condition of 
rural employment in Shandong was clearly inferior to that of either Guangdong 
or Sichuan. Farms were generally larger in north China and productivity lower, 
requiring closer supervision and  control of laborers and tenants.49 Qualitative 
analysis of Shandong disputes in my earlier study revealed that individuals involved 
in violence were often quite poor and their employment was tenuous. Landlords 
hired managers who wielded great power over tenants and hired laborers. Evidence 
from homicide reports reveals that these managers readily dismissed tenants and 
laborers for poor performance and that the managers themselves could be fired at the 
whim of the landowner. Tenant farmers and hired laborers also had little personal 
freedom and economic independence. Many lived in their landlords’ home and 
relied on their landlords for draught animals, plows, and seeds.50 While a range of 
variables might explain the lower incidence of violence in Shandong, capital case 
records vividly reveal that individuals involved in disputes in Shandong were worse 
off economically than their counterparts in Sichuan and Guangdong.
Case records of capital crimes from Shandong frequently reveal tantalizing 
glimpses into life in eighteenth-century rural society. Consider the case involving 
Jiang Hansan, Fan Wuyuan, Li Jing, and Wang Yin, who were all tenants on Chen 
 Gengwu’s land.51 What makes this case interesting is the migrant status of the 
tenants : Jiang Hansan was from Guancheng county, Fan Wuyuan was from Dingtao 
county, and Li Jing was from Puzhou county. Only Wang Ying was from Caoxian 
county, where the dispute occurred. This was quite different from Guangdong where 
tenants and landlords were almost always from the same county and many tenants, 
as former owners of the land they rented, had deep personal and customary ties to 
the land that they tilled. (Interestingly, the alacrity with which  Jiang’s fellow tenants 
came to his aid when a violent dispute arose with a neighboring landowner also 
47 See Buoye (2000).
48 Buoye (2000, Chapter six).
49 Li (1988, pp. 33-34).
50 Yang (1988, p. 54).
51 Xingke Tiben, tudi zhaiwu lei (刑科題本土地債務類hereafter XKTB), 3252, Qianlong 45.09.26. 
The archival source for the cases is the Number One Historical Archive in Beijing. The documents 
are Board of Punishments routine memorials (xingke tiben) from the category of land and debt (tudi 
zhaiwu lei), 3252 is the bundle number and the document was  compiled on the twenty-sixth day of 
the ninth month in the forty fifth year of the Qianlong reign (October 23, 1780).
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suggests a degree of class solidarity among hired laborers that was not found in 
Sichuan or Guangdong). The absence of personal ties to the land that they worked 
along with the fact that Shandong landlords often supplied the necessary capital, 
such as seeds and tools, may explain why tenants were treated like hired laborers in 
Shandong. This proletarianization of agricultural labor often meant that Shandong 
tenants were normally judged solely on performance and could be dismissed for 
‘laziness’. In Shandong, deadly  confrontations over property rights were rare, but 
what property-related violence did occur was clearly the domain of the desperately 
poor who had been left behind in the economic expansion of the eighteenth century.
THE LUCKLESS TENANT52
Wang  Chen’s fate poignantly illustrated the precarious nature of life in rural 
Shandong. Wang leased 24 mu (畆) of land from Guo Gengyuan in Wenshang 
county. Guo Gengyuan lived some distance from the field, so he entrusted Cheng 
Zhao with the management of the land. On the morning of 13 June 1749,53 it rained, 
and Wang Chen decided it was a good time to plant soy beans. He asked Cheng for 
the seeds. Unexpectedly, Cheng not only refused to provide the seeds, but he also 
accused Wang of being lazy and demanded that he return the land immediately. In 
his subsequent testimony, Cheng claimed that Wang had done a poor job of planting 
the sorghum and millet. Cheng feared that the landlord, Guo Gengyuan, would 
criticize him for  Wang’s poor work. Wang Chen suggested that they wait until after 
the autumn harvest before he relinquished the land. Unfortunately, Cheng not only 
rejected this request but also accused Wang of dishonesty. Cheng later claimed that 
he was only trying to frighten Wang in order to motivate him to work harder and did 
not really mean to evict Wang. Wang, however, took this threat quite seriously and 
replied : “If you demand that I return this land now, is it not the same as killing my 
family ?” Wang Chen died from the injuries suffered in the ensuing struggle with 
Cheng Zhao.
To the casual observer this case might appear to be an unfortunate but 
unexceptional example of manslaughter. An experienced official reading this case 
record however would no doubt take notice of evocative statements such as : “If 
you demand that I return this land now, is it not the same as killing my family ?” 
Declarations like these were not typical in case reports. Both the statement from the 
manager and his  tenant’s entreaty indicated the depth of despair and hopelessness of 
the rural poor in eighteenth-century Shandong. Wang was clearly a pitiful individual. 
Threatened with the loss of his livelihood he equated the loss of his tenancy to the 
death of his family. In a highly structured and otherwise unemotional recitation of the 
facts of the case, this statement had an immediate and jarring impact. The prominent 
positioning of such a powerful metaphor in an otherwise straightforward account 
must have been deliberate. In my opinion, by prominently quoting  Wang’s desperate 
plea, the magistrate was intentionally sending a powerful message to his superiors. 
Poverty was killing the family in Shandong. This was how a bare stick was created.
52 XKTB 0714, QL 15.4.17.
53 Dates in documents are given in reign year and lunar month. 13 June 1749, is QL 14.4.29, meaning 
the twenty ninth day of the fourth month in the fourteenth year of the Qianlong reign.
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THE HAPLESS GAMBLER54
Of course, many peasants lost their land, but they managed to survive as 
agricultural  contract workers. Perhaps employment in the  master’s household could 
provide a surrogate family for the landless laborer. Consider the case of Huang Bang. 
At forty-two sui (歲),55 Huang, who had no immediate family, was hired as a  contract 
worker in Ming  Keyi’s home on 23 December 1748. Huang had lost 2000 wen (文) 
gambling with three of his co-workers, Li Hai, Ming Kuijiu, and Yang Seng, all of 
whom tried repeatedly to collect the debt. In 1749, after the wheat harvest  Huang’s 
workmates once again dunned him. Huang went to his employer, Ming Keyi, and 
asked him for some grain in advance of his wages so that he could pay his debts, 
but Ming, “unaware that it was a gambling debt”,56 refused. Huang became angry 
and cursed Ming,  complaining that he had no face. When Huang finally received his 
wages, 500 wen, he used them to pay part of his debt.
On 21 April 1749, Ming Kuijiu informed Ming Keyi (same surname but not 
related) that Huang had gambling debts. Huang overheard Ming Keyi advise Ming 
Kuijiu to wait until after the harvest to dun Huang. Ming Keyi further advised 
that if Huang could not pay in full, Ming Kuijiu should beat him and take him to 
the officials. About six months later, Huang overheard Ming Keyi and Yang Seng 
chatting about the gambling debt. Once again the boss repeated his advice to beat 
Huang and take him to the officials. At this point Huang became desperate. Huang 
testified that he knew Ming Keyi would “expel him after his work was  completed” 
and that Ming Keyi had ordered his co-workers to demand money, beat him, and 
take him to court.
When Huang realized that he would lose his livelihood he “harbored resentment 
all the more deeply,” and “murderous thoughts arose”. Knowing that physically he 
was no match for his boss, he thought about killing  Ming’s two sons instead. The 
next day he went to the market to buy poison that he intended to use on himself after 
he killed the boys. On his way home he bumped into Ming Kuijiu, and they argued 
loudly. After Ming Kuijiu returned home he informed Ming Keyi, who sought 
Huang out and  confronted him. Huang also threatened to sue Ming Keyi for stirring 
up trouble for him. Upset and angry, Huang waited until Keyi left the house the next 
morning. Armed with a wooden mallet, he entered the sleeping quarters of  Keyi’s 
two young sons and smashed their skulls.
Ming Keyi later testified that Huang was from a nearby village and worked for a 
living. According to Ming,  Huang’s “character had never been good”, but he hired 
him because Huang was a capable farmer. Ming admitted that he hated Huang for 
gambling and stirring up trouble, and that he had suggested that Kuijiu “sue” Huang 
(his own testimony omitted reference to beating), but he asserted that the matter of 
the debt did not  concern him. Ming Keyi also emphatically stated that he did not 
incite Ming Kuijiu to dun Huang. Instead he claimed that he was  concerned that 
there might be trouble if the co-workers privately dunned Huang so it was better to 
54 XKTB 0714, QL15.4.17.
55 Traditionally, Chinese reckoned age as one sui at birth. A newborn is one sui at birth and “turns” two 
at the start of the second year. In this way an individual who is 42 sui might be 40 or 41 by Western 
reckoning.
56 Noting that the employer, Ming Keyi was “unaware” that this was a gambling debt, absolves Ming of 
any  connection to the crime of gambling.
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take the matter to court. Finally, Ming explained that he had  confronted Huang the 
day before the killings because Ming Kuijiu told him that Huang was threatening to 
sue him. Ming could not understand why Huang hated him so much that he killed 
his two sons.
Not surprisingly, Huang had a different version of events.  Huang’s testimony 
emphasized that he was  completely dependent on his master, Ming Keyi, for his 
livelihood. Huang  complained that Ming had twice told his workmates to beat him 
and sue him and that he feared Ming would turn him out of his home. In his final 
cross examination, Huang stated that he was a poor person who hired out to make his 
living and relied on his employer to look after him. According to Huang, Ming Keyi 
twice spoke “wicked words” to his co-workers. He accused Ming of waiting until 
the harvest was in to turn him out, and of inciting his workmates to turn him in to the 
local officials. Huang noted that his wages were insufficient and asked rhetorically, 
“If I lost the  master’s pay, how could I repay my debts ?” Expressing his  complete 
despair, Huang inveighed : “This clearly would put an end to my livelihood and 
would lead to my death”. Thus, he was angry and wanted to kill Ming Keyi. In final 
effort to obtain leniency, Huang admitted his guilt and declared that he was willing 
to pay for his crime with his life.
The crime was heinous and brutal, and there was no question that the punishment 
would be severe. Huang was sentenced to “lingering death”57 for the premeditated 
killing of his  master’s two sons. There was no hope of leniency in this case, no matter 
how pathetically Huang was portrayed. Why then would the report include this 
poignant depiction of a desperately pitiful  contract worker ? I would argue that the 
portrayal of Huang was meant to inform or warn higher level officials about the dire 
social  consequences of the abject poverty in Shandong countryside. Chinese society 
was ideally built on hierarchical relationships that carried mutual obligations. Huang 
was alone in the world but he still sought honest employment rather than crime. 
Because he was bereft of family, his employer was his only possible benefactor 
in times of distress. Huang felt betrayed when his employer not only refused to 
help him but also aggravated his plight by instigating his workmates to sue him. In 
his desperation, Huang intentionally killed both of his  master’s sons. Few crimes 
were more abominable in Confucian society, yet the county magistrate, rather than 
revile the killer, presented a nuanced account that explained the depth of  Huang’s 
desperation.
THE MAKING OF A BARE STICK58
The case of Kuang Wenqi provided another tragic and barbarous example of 
the toll that  Shandong’s grinding poverty was taking on individuals, illustrating the 
57 Also translated into English as death by a thousand cuts or death by slicing, lingering death entailed 
flaying of the limbs, dismemberment, and decapitation. In judicial practice, there were three forms of 
capital punishment : strangulation, decapitation, and lingering death. Based on the Confucian belief 
that the body should be returned ‘whole’ to ones’ parents, any mutilation of the body was  considered 
unfilial. (See Feng (1983, p. 358)). Thus, strangulation was  considered the least severe punishment 
because the body remained intact. Lingering death was the most severe form of capital punishment 
because the body was dismembered.
58 XKTB 0714, QL15.4.17.
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slow, agonizing, and dehumanizing descent into rootless poverty. After his father 
died, Kuang Wenqi was raised by his uncle Kuang Yuxiang and his aunt Ms. Dong, 
with whom he shared a home. Wenqi was described as “not law-abiding”, and his 
uncle often lectured him. According to neighbors, Ms. Dong was a mean person who 
never displayed kindness to her nephew.  Kuang’s aunt was portrayed as a shrew who 
often interfered in  Wenqi’s life. When her husband agreed to lend Wenqi money, 
Ms. Dong intervened to stop him. Wenqi lived modestly and was married, but not 
happily. Ms. Dong disparaged Wenqi to his wife, causing the couple to fight often. 
Neighbors testified that Kuang Wenqi had a difficult life and that he blamed his aunt 
for the deaths of his mother and brother, his marital difficulties, and his dire straits. 
The magistrate also described Ms. Dong as “harsh” and “too talkative in front of her 
husband”, one of the seven grounds for divorce under Qing law. Suffice to say, the 
portrayal of Ms. Dong was uniformly unflattering.
In the fall of 1747, while Kuang Wenqi was away trading, his mother and younger 
brother died. His uncle and aunt had them buried after his maternal uncle arrived to 
 confirm the circumstances of their deaths. When Wenqi returned home he suspected 
that his aunt had “worn them down” to death and he harbored resentment against his 
aunt. In February 1748, Kuang sold his wife for 10,000 wen because she followed 
Ms.  Dong’s efforts to stir trouble. His uncle borrowed 4000, which he did not repay 
despite  Wenqi’s requests. In roughly six months Wenqi had lost his closest living 
relatives and he had sold his wife. His uncle, the only senior male relative in his life, 
took advantage of  Wenqi’s sale of his wife to borrow money which he did not repay.
Alone and with no one to rely on, Wenqi wandered as a vagrant. In his absence 
Ms. Dong occupied  Wenqi’s room in their home. On 20 December 1748, Kuang 
returned home, but Ms. Dong cursed him and refused to let him into the house. He 
asked his uncle to repay the money he had borrowed but his uncle refused. “Cold and 
hungry and without a home or kin to support him”, Kuang blamed all his troubles on 
Ms. Dong. The next day he returned to the house with a knife and stabbed Ms. Dong 
six times. When Ms.  Dong’s twelve-year-old son saw Wenqi the boy fled, but Wenqi 
chased him and slashed him with the knife. Returning to the house, Wenqi found Ms. 
 Dong’s five-year-old daughter crying and he killed her too. Covered in blood, Kuang 
immediately turned himself in to the authorities.
Clearly, Kuang  Wenqi’s crimes were unforgivable. He was sentenced to lingering 
death for killing three members of the same of family. But despite the viciousness of 
his crime, the county magistrate managed to evoke sympathy for  Wenqi’s downward 
spiral into poverty. While Ms. Dong did not deserve her brutal fate, it was clear from 
the case record that she cruelly tormented Wenqi. More telling was the language used 
to describe Wenqi after he sold his wife and wandered the countryside. He roved 
about “alone and had no one to rely on”. Similarly, when Kuang returned home to 
find that Ms. Dong refused to allow him to enter the courtyard and his uncle cursed 
when Kuang asked him to repay the money he owed, the county magistrate provided 
another pathetic image. He described Kuang as “cold, hungry and impoverished”, 
“without any place to stay”, and “bereft of kin”. In my extensive reading of homicide 
reports I have rarely seen this type of language. It was purposefully used to evoke 
pity for Kuang.
No amount of pity would save Kuang from his gruesome punishment, lingering 
death, but officials who reviewed the case could not help but notice the affective 
language used to describe  Kuang’s downward slide into penury.  Kuang’s life was a 
depressing illustration of rural distress and the disintegration of a family. He had lost 
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his mother and brother to disease, sold his wife, and his only kin had harassed him 
and rejected him in his hour of need. He was homeless, penniless, jobless and alone, 
but he had tried to carry on as an itinerant peddler. While Kuang Wenqi had become 
a bare stick in the simplest definition of the term, officials who reviewed the case 
would never  confuse him with the career criminals who used force and intimidation 
to survive. Kuang Wenqi was clearly flawed but his crime, no matter how heinous, 
was depicted as the final act of a pathetic man who had lost everything.
CONCLUSION
Historically, legal, moral, and political  concerns  combined to make capital cases 
an abiding and direct  concern of Chinese emperors for whom  compassion and mercy 
were  considered hallmarks of virtuous rule. The highly elaborate system of capital 
case and sentencing reviews were the institutional representation of these  concerns. 
Ostensibly, the role of the county magistrate in adjudicating capital crimes was 
strictly limited. But, as the primary author or ‘editor’ of the trial record, the county 
magistrate was uniquely positioned to influence superior judicial officials through 
his presentation of the facts,  construction of the narrative, and selective quotation of 
depositions. 59 Ironically, although the autumn assizes centralized review of capital 
cases to an unprecedented degree, the higher the level of judicial administration and 
the more removed from the original jurisdiction, the more dependent officials were 
on the information that the county magistrate provided in his case record. I would 
argue that the same editorial techniques that were used to expedite judicial review 
and to encourage leniency could also be used to present a more  complex picture 
understanding of the  connection between economic distress and violent crime.
When it came to understanding the true nature of crime, no one in the judicial 
bureaucracy was better informed than the county magistrate. The emotionally 
charged crime of rape provides another telling example of the gap between 
official perception and social reality. As Janet Theiss has found “ contrary to the 
assumptions of much judicial discussion on rape, most cases of sexual assault and 
adultery involved not male outsiders but neighbors, friends, and quite often even 
relatives.”60 Theiss’  conclusion is  consistent with Lai Huimin and Xu  Siling’s study 
of rape in eighteenth-century China61 as well as  contemporary research of sexual 
assaults.62 The apparent discrepancy between the real-world threat of bare stick 
rapists emphasized in imperial rhetoric and the social reality of the crime illustrates 
59 Karasawa (1995, pp. 212-250). It should be noted that  Karasawa’s cases are from the last decade 
of the Qing when, what I have called, the routinization of capital case reporting had been firmly 
established. In fact the increased ‘streamlining’ of capital case reporting was already evident over the 
course of the Qianlong reign.
60 Theiss (2004, p. 10).
61 See Lai, Xu (1998). Lai and Xu also found that most cases of sexual assault or harassment involved a 
male who was known to the victim. Sexual assault and harassment are difficult crimes to study under 
the best of circumstances. Neither Theiss nor Lai and Xu, attempts a systemic sampling of the tens of 
thousands extant case records available, but their findings are similar to  contemporary studies.
62 Available at [http ://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/rape-sexual-violence/victims-perpetrators.htm] (ac-
cessed 29 May 2013). Modern studies indicate that victims and perpetrators are often known to each 
other.
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the dilemma of grass-roots judicial officials. While the emphasis on the bare stick 
as sexual predator was largely a product of ill-informed ‘criminal profiling’ at the 
highest levels of judicial administration, judicial discourse made the bare stick the 
scapegoat and legislation targeted him for severe punishment. But as Theiss notes, 
regardless of whom they arrested and prosecuted, “magistrates were  confronted with 
a society that looked quite different from that imagined in morality handbooks”.63 
Thus, in the discharge of their judicial duties, local magistrates had to employ subtly 
in their reports. As Kuhn clearly demonstrated in his reconstruction of the sorcery 
scare of 1768, judicial officials who challenged imperial perceptions of crime did so 
at their own peril.
A close study of the case report suggests that, in addition to fulfilling the strict 
requirements of their judicial duties, some county magistrates used these account to 
instill awareness in superior officials of the harsh  conditions faced by the rural poor. 
The message  conveyed from Shandong was stark. The luckless tenant equated the 
loss of his livelihood with the death of his family. The hapless gambler belied the 
argument that hired laborers’ could count on their employers to substitute for the 
security of the family. Finally, Kuang  Wenqi’s life story was a painful panorama 
of the destruction of one  man’s family. As we have seen in the case of sexual 
crimes, recent studies indicate a significant gap between social reality and imperial 
perceptions. Just as any  competent county magistrates would have been aware that 
the crime of rape was far more  complicated than the imperial rhetoric indicated, 
the cases recounted above demonstrate that county magistrates in Shandong were 
firsthand witnesses to the destruction of the family, a phenomenon directly related to 
the emergence of bare sticks. 
Clearly county magistrates were capable of recognizing the  complexity of the 
plight of the downwardly mobile peasant, even those who  committed multiple 
homicides of  children. It is hard to imagine a case in which the legal, moral, and 
political tenor of the time was more heavily stacked against the criminals. Local 
officials were undoubtedly well aware of the official attitude and they could 
have easily echoed the strident tones of imperial  condemnations of rogue males. 
Nevertheless, at least in their representations of these crimes to their superiors, the 
county magistrates attempted to impart some knowledge of the sense of betrayal and 
the abject poverty that drove men to kill. Leniency for those who willfully killed 
was out of the question, yet even the perpetrators of these horrible crimes were 
not denied their humanity. To varying degrees the three cases employed evocative 
descriptions of rural distress and nuanced depictions of peasant families and hired 
laborers living on the margins of subsistence to issue a stark warning to central 
government authorities. Poverty was killing the family in Shandong.
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